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FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0660  
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3683  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 9339  
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 4290  
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 9368  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 4028  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2275  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0720  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000658

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DEPT FOR D, P, SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [NP](#)

SUBJECT: POLITICAL LEADERS SEEKING CLARITY WITH MAOISTS,  
ANXIOUS ABOUT KING'S INTENTIONS

REF: A. KATHMANDU 633

[1](#)B. KATHMANDU 455

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

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[1](#)1. (C) On March 9, SCA PDAS Donald Camp met separately with leaders from the three largest political parties, G.P. Koirala - Nepali Congress (NC), Sher Bahadur Deuba - Nepali Congress-Democratic (NC-D), and Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (UML) Acting General Secretary Amrit Kumar Bohara and Central Committee Member Bharat Mohan Adhikari and assured them of U.S. support for Nepal's return to democracy. All were very interested to know whether the King had indicated during Camp's March 8 audience (ref A) that he would move in a positive direction. The NC and UML leaders explained to Camp that their representatives were meeting with the Maoists in New Delhi to urge the Maoists to meet their commitments under the 12-point understanding. G.P. Koirala's comment that he had risked his political career on this attempt to bring the Maoists into the political mainstream was worrisome as it indicated the Parties might be negotiating other issues with the Maoists. End Summary.

Parties Curious To Know King's Intentions

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[1](#)2. (C) All of the Party leaders expressed appreciation for U.S. support. NC-D President and former Prime Minister Deuba commented that the President's stand for democracy was "encouraging for democrats around the world." The leaders were very interested to discover what had transpired during Camp's March 8 audience with King Gyanendra, betraying their hope that the King would make a positive move and reach out to the political leaders. Camp explained that he had repeated the message that the President had given in New Delhi urging the King to reach out to the political parties. Camp told them that the King had said he planned to go forward with elections and that we had pressed him to include the political parties to avoid a repeat of the February

municipal elections. The Ambassador noted that the King seemed increasingly nervous; Gyanendra had been more forthright than previously in saying he recognized the need to get the political parties involved. The Ambassador added, however, that the King would likely attempt to minimize any concessions to the Parties.

NC Giving King Time ...

13. (C) NC President Koirala said he would continue to give the King some time to move in a positive direction toward reconciliation. He commented that he had not spoken out publicly over the last two months to "give the King time to settle his mind properly." However, he acknowledged that students and others among his party cadre were pressing him to have public meetings and speak out. Although he had postponed those for a few days, he would have to go ahead with public meetings in different parts of the country soon.

... While Trying To Transform the Maoists

14. (C) G.P. Koirala asserted that he had "gambled my political career" on trying to bring the Maoists into the constitutional framework and political mainstream. He stressed that dialogue was the best way to solve the Maoist insurgency. Koirala took up what had previously been a UML argument: the need to transform the Maoists, or at least provide them the opportunity to transform themselves. For their part, the UML leaders reiterated their desire to change the Maoists, but stressed that the Maoists must give up violence to have a relationship with the political parties. Koirala also remarked that there had been "some sort of relaxation" of Maoist pressure on party cadre in rural areas.

The Ambassador stressed to NC's Koirala that, as the President indicated, the U.S. did not think the Maoists could be an acceptable player as long as they practiced violence. While contending that if the effort failed it would not hurt the country, and acknowledging it might not succeed, Koirala seemed to be laying down a marker that NC was pursuing some unstated agenda with the Maoists.

Parties Pushing The Maoists to Call Off Strikes

15. (C) The UML leaders explained that NC and UML party representatives were meeting with the Maoists in New Delhi to discuss the need for the Maoists to faithfully implement their commitments under the 12-point understanding. Koirala stated that the NC representatives' instructions were limited to urging the Maoists to implement their commitments, which were not being followed on the ground. Only then, he stressed, could the seven-party alliance restart dialogue with the Maoists. Adhikari subsequently explained that the NC and UML delegation was in New Delhi to urge the Maoists to withdraw their indefinite transportation blockade and strike (planned to begin March 14) as well as the indefinite nationwide general strike, set to begin April 3. The Party representatives were arguing that the Maoists should agree to call off their actions to give the Parties' peaceful movement a chance to succeed. Adhikari saw this as a way to measure Maoist intentions. He speculated that the Parties would be able to determine the Maoists' sincerity before March 14. Adhikari claimed that if the Maoists did not cancel their actions and support the Parties' peace movement, the Parties would tell the people that "the 12-point understanding was just a Maoist understanding."

The Maoist Agenda?

16. (C) Bohara acknowledged that the Maoists had their own demands for the negotiations in Delhi, but would not provide further details. NC-D President Deuba remarked that Koirala and UML leaders had told him they went to see the Maoists to put pressure on them to cease their killing, extorting,

abductions, etc., which the seven-party alliance had publicly decried (ref A). However, he added "that's what they say, I do not know." The NC-D leader worried that the Maoists had deliberately not invited his party to participate in the New Delhi dialogue. He expressed concern that the King had in essence pushed G.P. Koirala, who had always been against the Maoists, as had the UML, into the Maoist fold. Explaining that he personally did not trust the Maoists, and at the same time did not trust the King, Deuba acknowledged that he was getting a lot of pressure from his own party cadre. Deuba also told us that both Prachanda and Bhattarai had called him at his residence upon his release from detention (ref B). According to Deuba, Prachanda had asked him to tell the Ambassador that "the Maoists were not against the U.S." - his anti-U.S. statements were all "ideological rhetoric."

Comment

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¶7. (C) The parties' talks with the Maoists in New Delhi are taking place against a backdrop of continued Maoist violence across the country. It appears the Maoists are preparing to initiate their transportation strike even as discussions in New Delhi are ongoing. The Maoist cadre, according to one Embassy source, are primed for their blockades and strike. It is positive, however, that the Parties are testing the Maoist intentions, which remain unclear. Perhaps greater clarity will emerge in the coming days following the NC and UML negotiations. The aging political leader Koirala's statement that he is risking his legacy on bringing the Maoists into the mainstream is an indication that the parties will not easily walk away from their current alignment with the Maoists. This factor, combined with the Maoists' ongoing plans for disruption and violence, are further indications that the stakes have been raised in Nepal's long-running political crisis.

¶8. (U) PDAS Camp did not have an opportunity to clear this cable.  
MORIARTY